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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN NORRIS ALEXANDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, APPELLANT'S REPLY 
vs. 
DIANE JEAN ALEXANDER, Supreme Court No. 20841 
Defendant and Respondent. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
CONSIDERATIONS OF STABILITY, CONTINUITY 
AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
PREPONDERATE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF BEING 
AWARDED CUSTODY 
In response to that argument set forth in defendant's brief, plaintiff 
concedes that in such matters the trial court has broad latitude and that a 
great deal of confidence is placed in the trial court's decision. As argued in 
appellant's brief, Point I, however, such confidence and deference to the 
trial court should be dependent upon a record unequivocally demonstrating that 
the trial court exercised its discretion in accordance with the standards that 
have been set by this Court. The contrary is patently evident in the record 
and the findings here. 
The main thrust of defendant's argument in Point I of respondent's 
brief appears to address considerations of stability and continuity, the irony 
of which is poignantly apparent. The case here before the Court is salient 
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evidence t h a t the s t a t e does not hold a monopoly on " d i s r u p t i o n " of 
c h i l d - p a r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In Ju ly of 1984 the defendant abruptly removed 
Jamie from her home since b i r t h , from the care and p r o t e c t i o n and f i nanc i a l 
well-being provided by her father, from the concern, love and at tent ion of he^ 
th ree older s ib l ings , and then took th i s young child on a t r i p that led f i r s t 
to two locations in Montana, then South Dakota and f i n a l l y Missour i , during 
which time Jamie shared a bed, apparently in various motels, with her mother 
and with another man, James Dvorak (see T. 72-73, also see the t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
references to that t r i p , par t icular ly a t T. 136). That relat ionship lasted not 
much longer than t h a t t r i p p lus three weeks. A more disruptive* and unstable 
course of events in a young ch i ld ' s l i f e is hardly imaginable. 
The importance of c o n t i n u i t y and s t a b i l i t y in the l i f e of young 
ch i ld ren i s well documented. The only expert to t e s t i fy in the t r i a l below, 
Dr. Nilsson, t es t i f i ed regarding the defendant: 
From her impulsivity, from her poor judgment, and events 
of t h e l a s t n i n e months , I f e e l t h a t t h a t type of 
behavior , t h a t type of impuls iv i ty and poor judgment 
c r e a t e s a g r ea t deal of s t ress on children, especially a 
very young chi ld . 
I t f s i m p o r t a n t t h a t t hey have t h a t s t a b i l i t y and 
consistency that appears to have been absent. (T. 55) 
Dr. N i l s s o n 1 s test imony addressed not only the c i r c u m s t a n t i a l 
i n s t ab i l i t y (abrupt desertion of home and family, the traveling from c i ty to 
city) , but also the lack of consistency and s t a b i l i t y of an emotional or 
psychologica l na tu re . Both kinds of s t a b i l i t y are important factors in the 
normal development of young c h i l d r e n . Both k i n d s of i n s t a b i l i t y a r e 
manifested in the defendant; as the t r i a l court noted: "There's been a great 
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deal of i n s t ab i l i t y . " (T. 135-136). 
The defendant c i t e s Shioji v. Shioji , 23 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (11/27/85) 
and addresses a concern that is something of a "catch-22," arguing that th i s 
Court should not reverse the t r i a l cour t because tha t , in i t se l f , would 
resul t in a substantial disruption of the young c h i l d ' s l i f e . Defendant 's 
p o i n t i s not well taken for a t l e a s t two reasons . F i r s t , t h i s concern 
underlies and is taken into due cons ide ra t ion in the standard of review. 
Secondly, i t i s an i n v i t a t i o n to affirm an otherwise erroneous decision, 
which i s an unsound proposal to beget unsound p r i n c i p l e s of law. The 
defendant i s r i g h t , of course , to argue that th i s child shouldn't suffer 
from the lengthy appellate process; the appropriate reform, however, i s not 
to be found in affirming er ror . 
The defendant rec i tes facts that are not supported by the record; a 
sa l ient example is the de fendan t ' s a s s e r t i o n , a t page 2 of respondent ' s 
b r i e f , t h a t p l a i n t i f f engaged in a course of conduct abusive toward 
defendant and the children. The Court is respectfully re fe r red not only to 
the test imony of the ch i ld ren in chambers, T. 114-120, but to the t r i a l 
cour t ' s findings 3 and 7, and to the s ta tements of the t r i a l cour t a t T. 
133. 
Another example of m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the facts is apparent in 
de fendan t ' s argument a t page 14 of responden t ' s b r i e f , a d d r e s s i n g an 
apparent dec l ine in the academic performance of Stephen J r . The argued 
impl ica t ion i s t h a t t h i s i s evidence of a d e f i c i e n c y in p l a i n t i f f ' s 
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p a r e n t i n g a b i l i t i e s ; t h i s i s a b l a t a n t misd iagnos i s . Our soc ie ty i s 
u n f o r t u n a t e l y r e p l e t e wi th e v i d e n c e of t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s faced in 
s i n g l e - p a r e n t homes. An obvious source of Stephen J r . ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s , his 
decline in school performance, was the abrupt t r a n s i t i o n from l i v ing in a 
two parent home to l iving in a single parent home. The defendant had placed 
a thousand miles between h e r s e l f and her son ' s academic problems. The 
p l a i n t i f f on the other hand was there to help, to arrange some tutor ing, to 
d isc ip l ine if necessary. Afteral l , we are talking about a young teenager who 
has been abandoned by his mother I 
The defendant asser ts t ha t "Dr. N i l s s o n ' s f indings are s u s p e c t . " 
There i s , however, absolutely nothing in the record to controvert or dispute 
h i s e x p e r t i s e , or to cast suspicion on his motives. Defendant characterizes 
15 - 20 one hour s e s s i o n s as a " sma l l amount of t i m e , " bu t i t i s 
r e s p e c t f u l l y submitted t ha t tha t is actually a very substantial amount of 
con t ac t . A review of Dr. N i l s s o n ' s tes t imony c l e a r l y s e t s f o r t h t h e 
background and basis for his opinion that i t would be in a l l four chi ldren 's 
bes t i n t e r e s t to r e s i d e with the p l a i n t i f f , and fur ther why he did not 
consider h i s f indings suspect (see T. 63-64) . Unfor tunate ly , even when 
s p e c i f i c f indings were requested the t r i a l court made no reference to Dr. 
Nilsson at a l l . 
While an expert !s opinion i s not binding on a t r i a l c o u r t , i t i s 
obviously a s i g n i f i c a n t factor to be carefully considered. The t r i a l court 
here seems to have ignored that uncontroverted tes t imony, even though i t 
cor robora ted other test imony ind i ca t i ng t h a t the de fendan t ' s l i f e was 
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affected with instability and poor judgment; the trial court expressed no 
explanation for ignoring Dr. Nilsson's opinion. This amounts to a strong 
indication that the trial court failed to consider pertinent, if not crucial 
information, and this is, in itself, an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
There seems to be a conceptual trap in custody disputes that results 
in the characterization of the parties as warring parents seeking to "take 
away" a child from its mother or father; this too often distracts us from 
the fact that custody is not so much * reward as it is a very serious 
responsibility, that the true objective is to award the child what is in 
that child's best interest. Neither party in a custody dispute has a burden 
to show that the other deserves to "lose" custody. Apparent could show that 
they can and probably will provide a very good home and yet, upon a basis of 
comparison, the other parent may be awarded custody. The highest priority 
must be given to the best interests of the child. 
The case now before the Court is not, unfortunately, a case of 
choosing the better over the good. In the trial court it was a case of 
choosing the mother over the father, except that the mother had, among many 
other things including cruel treatment, abandoned three of her children. So 
she "lost" custody of those three. She wasn't unfit, so she was granted 
custody of the fourth, as the best "division" the court could make. The 
court may have intended well but this decision constituted a flagrant abuse 
of discretion to the detriment not only of plaintiff, but to the detriment 
of Darla Alexander, Beverly Alexander and Stephen Alexander Jr., who 
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expressed their desire to have their little sister home (see T. 114-120) , 
and most of all to little Jamie Alexander, who may very well grow up to 
still love her mother, just as her older siblings, but who deserves the more 
stable, economically secure and family oriented environment of the home of 
her father, and her sisters and her brother. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of January, 1986. 
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